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Is ASEAN learning from the experience of the European 
Civil Protection Mechanism? 
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Abstract
Why, following the EU’s first attempts at advancing community cooperation in civil protection and the cre-
ation of the EU civil protection mechanism, has ASEAN undertaken new initiatives, such as the adoption of 
a legally binding accord, AADMER and a formal institution, the AHA Center, largely comparable to the insti-
tutional innovations endorsed by the EU, in the same issue area? Can these developments be interpreted 
simply as the result of independent decision-making by ASEAN or are they at least a partial outcome of a 
transfer process? The aim of this study is to contribute to the emerging debate on European influence in 
Southeast Asia, taking into account how processes of policy and institutional transfer may lead ASEAN’s re-
gion builders to learn from the EU’s experience. Specifically, by discussing the case of disaster management, 
which has remained largely unexplored by comparative IR literature, this study argues that independent 
problem solving does not offer an adequate explanation of ASEAN’s developments. Conversely, lesson 
drawing and emulation are suggested as the two most relevant underlying mechanisms which can explain 
the gradual and selective adoption of an EU-like model of disaster cooperation. 
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1. Introduction1
In July 2005, the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER or the Agreement), an innova-
tive legally binding accord, which came into effect in 2009 after the completion of the ratification process. 
It committed all member states to reduce disaster losses in the region and to jointly respond to disaster 
emergencies. With the Agreement, ASEAN members have also endorsed the idea of creating their own re-
gional disaster management center, known as the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance 
(AHA). Since then, the institutionalization process of disaster cooperation has been noteworthy. It has 
included the official launch of the AHA Center in November 2011, and the gradual adoption of several new 
cooperative mechanisms to improve the level of intra-regional cooperation in this sphere.
In the Southeast Asian context, the emergence and rise of cooperation in the area of disaster manage-
ment2, that is activities aimed at protecting the population from the consequences of disaster, is anything 
but self-explanatory. In fact, because this domain has been traditionally consigned to the exclusive com-
petence of nation states, the creation of formal structures and procedures to cope with disasters comes as 
a surprise. Due to historical and political circumstances, ASEAN members have pursued an individualistic 
approach, refusing joint undertakings and maintaining the Westphalian state as the centerpiece around 
which standards of behavior for regional cooperation have been designed. But more importantly, these 
developments, are on a par with EU-like civil protection structures and instruments, which culminated in 
2001, with the creation of the European Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM), aimed at facilitating coopera-
tion between EU member states in response to a number of natural and man-made disasters.
Inevitably, ASEAN’s new initiatives, largely comparable to the institutional innovations advanced by the EU 
in the same issue area, raise some important questions which will be explored in this study. Why, following 
the EU’s first attempts at advancing community cooperation in civil protection and the creation of the CPM, 
has ASEAN created a formal institution, the AHA Center, which mirrors the CPM to a certain extent? Why 
has ASEAN adopted new formalized and intrusive mechanisms and practices of cooperation similar to 
those of the EU, thus challenging its traditional informal cooperative approach? How can we account for 
these developments? Can they be interpreted as the result of an independent decision made by ASEAN, or 
are they an outcome, at least partially, of a process of transfer?
These questions are even more puzzling given the fact that ASEAN has traditionally presented itself as an 
alternative model to the West (Yeo 2008) in terms of institutional design, centered on a low level of insti-
tutionalization, bureaucratization and flexibility (Acharya 1999; 2012), as well as in terms of constitutive 
1 This research would not have been possible without the financial and institutional support from the Kolleg-
Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe”. I am particularly grateful to Tanja Börzel and Thomas 
Risse and to all the members of the jour fix at the Freie Universität in Berlin for their support and helpful feedbacks 
on earlier drafts of this paper.  I am also indebted to officials at the ASEAN Secretariat, the AHA Center, national 
disaster management organizations of ASEAN members, EU External Actions Service and ECHO who have agreed 
to be interviewed in Jakarta in February, 2014. As those interviewed asked for confidentiality, their names will not 
be mentioned.
2 In the European context these activities are defined by the term civil protection.
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values (Farrell 2009), which are centered on the so-called ASEAN way emphasizing a commitment to soli-
darity, informality, non-interference and respect for national sovereignty (Caballero Anthony 1998; Acharya 
2009a; Amer 2008; Narine 2008). These aspects of ASEAN’s design have led to the general understanding 
that anything comparable to the EU in the Asia Pacific was unthinkable (Jetschke/Murray 2012: 175).
To answer these questions, political scientists have tended to espouse variants of liberal IR theory that ana-
lyze the adoption of comparable institutional solutions and mechanisms by different regional organizations 
and find them to result from independent but similar reactions to parallel problem pressures. A different 
theoretical starting point takes into account processes of horizontal-interdependent decision-making and 
considers how the evolution of ASEAN formal institutions and modalities of cooperation can be attributed 
to the influence of the EU. This approach holds some important lessons for the wider world, including 
Southeast Asia, in that similar institutional processes can be explained as the result of interdependent 
rather than independent choices.
Although the ASEAN experience represents a hard case for policy and institutional transfer from the EU, 
because the principles of the ASEAN way render ASEAN regionalism distinctive and sui generis (Murray/
Moxon-Browne 2013), some scholars have already begun to show how European institutions and policies, 
for example, in areas of economic and political integration and also human rights (Yeo 2008; Jetschke 2009, 
2010; Jetschke/Murray 2012; Lenz 2012), might even travel to a very distinctive regional organization, such 
as ASEAN. Placing itself in the same vein, this study also attempts to contribute to the emerging debate on 
European influence in Southeast Asia, taking into account how processes of transfer may lead ASEAN’s re-
gion builders to learn from the EU’s experience and to emulate its specific features (Breslin/Higgott 2000). 
More specifically, by discussing the case study of disaster management cooperation, so far left largely 
unexplored by comparative IR literature, I argue that independent problem solving does not offer an ade-
quate explanation of the processes that are taking place in Southeast Asia. Instead I argue that it is the EU, 
which exercises some influence on the design of ASEAN structures and modalities of cooperation in this 
field. Even though the EU does not actively use mechanisms of socialization, assistance or conditionally 
to induce transfer processes of disaster management to the ASEAN context, it functions as a reference 
point for ASEAN. I contend in fact, that it is as a result of domestic causes, above all the pressure of the 
growing threat of disasters, combined with ASEAN’s lack of institutional infrastructure to cope with disaster 
risk, that the ASEAN Committee of Disaster Management (ACDM)3 through the active role of the ASEAN 
Secretariat has started to look at the EU model of disaster cooperation. In particular, it is argued that, since 
the establishment of the AHA Center in 2011 as the operational engine of AADMER, ASEAN has initiated 
a process whereby the CPM has begun to draw from the EU CPM to design its own regional modalities of 
cooperation. Yet, given the significant disparities between the two regions, it is far-fetched to believe that 
the EU civil protection experience has been entirely transferred to ASEAN and it is unlikely that it ever will 
be. As it shall be uncovered in the course of this study, ASEAN is selectively borrowing from the EU, yet it is 
unwilling to alter its core values and principles.
Based on these premises, this paper proceeds as follows: first, it briefly reviews the conventional view on 
ASEAN and EU institutional design and modalities of cooperation. Subsequently, it compares and traces 
3 The ACDM is the body responsible for coordinating regional activities in disaster management.
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similarities between the ASEAN and the EU disaster management systems by making use of the analytical 
framework proposed by Bremberg and Britz (2009) to uncover the institutional design of different civil pro-
tection systems. The literature on policy transfer is then presented as the conceptual framework guiding 
this study. In particular, lesson-drawing and emulation are suggested as the two most relevant underlying 
mechanisms explaining the gradual and selective adoption of an EU-like model of disaster cooperation. The 
argument is consequently tested in the empirical part of the work, which is based on fieldwork conducted 
in Jakarta and Europe in 2014, consisting of approximately 20 elite interviews, as well as on the analysis of 
primary and secondary sources. 
In summation, the study aims to offer a twofold contribution. On the one hand, it adds empirical evidence 
to the literature on transfer from the EU to ASEAN, which is an unlikely case for the adoption of EU-style 
structures and modus operandi. On the other hand, this paper suggests that the EU plays an important role 
as a concrete reference point, even in distant regions, where the EU has fewer incentives to promote its re-
gional model of cooperation (Börzel/Risse 2012: 8). Therefore, the paper does not agree with those studies, 
which argue that the EU has little or no influence particularly in the security sphere, given the dominance 
of the United States and China (Cameron 2010; Yeo 2010). More specifically, non-traditional security issues, 
such as disaster management, are considered the new important domains in the EU’s relations with ASEAN. 
2. Comparing the EU and ASEAN: The Conventional View
Mainstream literature has depicted ASEAN as an anti-EU model (Yeo 2008; Heng 2009). The EU differs from 
ASEAN in significant ways with respect to economic, political and social factors, which point to “region-
ally specific, systematically different patterns of politics and policies” (Katzenstein 2007: 396). Studies on 
ASEAN suggest that the long campaign of Konfrontasi, which refers to the conflict against the newly-estab-
lished federation of Malaysia and the Philippines led by Sukarno, and disputes over Sabah, became pivotal 
events behind initial efforts to advance forms of regional cooperation and to mitigate inter-state tensions. 
They eventually culminated in the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 (Tavares 2010; Emmers 2003). 
Given these historical experiences and the cultural context, the five ASEAN founding members, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, set up their regional organization distinc-
tively from the EU. The fear that the withdrawal of colonial powers would leave a vacuum and attract 
outsiders looking for political gains, the potential spread of communist insurgencies and the domestic 
troubles of ASEAN states facing the new experience of becoming independent, along with the influence of 
external powers, inter-state and intra-state disputes, and finally regional suspicion and mistrust, led to the 
creation of an institution founded on a strict defense of the principles of national sovereignty and non-in-
terference. These principles have contributed to the unlikeliness of ASEAN ever becoming a deeply insti-
tutionalized supranational organization like the EU (Acharya 2009; Emmers 2003; Emmerson 2008; Narine 
2002). Furthermore, disparities in the political and governmental systems of ASEAN-members, composed 
of both democratic and authoritarian states, with varying levels of economic development as well as di-
verse religious and cultural traditions, induced ASEAN members to opt for a light institutional framework 
of regional cooperation centered on the avoidance of excessive institutionalization and of bureaucratic 
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structures with decision-making authorities (Acharya 2009a; Emmers 2003; Emmerson 2008; Narine 2002).
Thus, unlike the more intrusive and legalistic modus operandi of Europe, the most vibrant mechanisms 
through which ASEAN has managed to build confidence, familiarity and understanding to manage tensions 
and pursue its commitment to “accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in order to strengthen the foundation of a prosperous regional community” (Bangkok Declaration 1967) 
have been formal and informal meetings conducted at an elite level between ASEAN leaders, ministers and 
senior officials (Kiwimaki 2002). The practice of consultation (musyawarah) and the pursuit of consensus 
building (mukafat) have formed the heart of the ASEAN approach (Acharya 1999). The principles of the 
so-called ASEAN way, laid down in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), which guide regional co-
operation, have remained anchored in tacit and passive modalities of inter-state cooperation, centered on 
the commitment to solidarity, informality, minimal institutionalization, non-interference and respect for 
national sovereignty (Acharya 2009a; Amer 2008; Narine 2008).
In summation, compared to the EU, which operates with a formal set of institutions with codified methods 
of decision-making, legal agreements and more intrusive modus operandi, the ASEAN way was clearly out-
side the parameters of formal structures and institutions, and sharply contrasted with Western legalistic 
criteria (Caballero Anthony 1998; Haacke 2003; Leifer 1989; Severino 2006). No wonder then, that some 
studies contend that considering the EU experience a paradigm of regionalism implies a perception of 
the EU as an integration snob (Murray 2010), and that imposing the EU model as a kind of Gold Standard 
(Sbragia 2008) may appear to be hegemonic (Acharya 2009b) or inappropriate (Murray/Moxon-Browne 
2013). Given the sheer diversity of ASEAN and the EU in terms of economic, political, historical and cultural 
factors, no single institution, formula or approach can apply all by itself (Acharya 2012).
3. Dealing with Natural Disasters: Tracing the Similarity between EU and ASEAN Disaster 
Management Systems
Despite a major claim in the literature of comparative regionalism that regional organization in Europe and 
Southeast Asia has taken different forms, reflecting different regional contexts and cultural values, it would 
be misleading to consider regional institutions as static entities. While different constitutive values and 
modes of cooperation are undoubtedly true, one cannot ignore that in some arenas, for example in the 
field of non-traditional security issues “whose nature is short of the traditional state versus state pattern” 
(Maier-Knapp 2010: 78), the assertion that the EU and ASEAN models reflect unique forms, underpinned 
by the regional context, should be loosened (Pennisi di Floristella 2013). It is indeed important to recognize 
that there have been significant changes both within the European Union and ASEAN, reflecting the con-
tinued evolution of the two actors (Rees 2010). These changes have been accompanied by a tendency of 
regional processes to grow more alike, in terms of both formal structures and modus operandi. The case of 
disaster management adds to other cases already discussed in the comparative literature, which highlight 
surprising similarities between ASEAN and the EU that have so far remained undetected.
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First, one must note that the conventional view, which sees the EU as operating with a set of supranational 
institutions, as opposed to ASEAN’s intergovernmental structures, does not apply to this case. In general, 
the activities pertaining to the management of natural as well as man-made disasters have traditionally 
been remitted to the exclusive domain of nation states in both regions. Differently from other fields where 
EU members have ceded portions of their sovereign powers to European supranational structures, civil 
protection is still handled inter-governmentally and reflects the EU member states’ reluctance to delegate 
full disaster responsibilities to the supranational level (Ekengren et al. 2006). Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, 
which has recently introduced the co-decision procedure and qualified majority in the Council, decisions 
to take measures within this area were made by consensus in the Council, based on a proposal from the 
Commission and an opinion from the European Parliament. This process implied that each member had 
its own veto power in the Council and eventually rendered the European approach similar to the ASEAN 
consensus-based and intergovernmental practice of cooperation. 
Second, despite the fact that member states in both organizations appeared less willing to cede too much 
authority to supranational institutions and despite ASEAN’s preference for informality, both ASEAN and 
the EU have recently set up formal institutional structures to facilitate disaster cooperation and coordi-
nation with regard to the monitoring of, and the response to emergencies, which overstrain nation states’ 
capacities. The advent of major calamities, such as the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 or the events of 9/11, 
created a sense of urgency for the need of a coordinated EU disaster strategy (Boin et al. 2013: 25). Through 
the Council Decision of 23 October 2001, the CPM was officially launched as the first regional instrument 
that allows EU member states to identify shared resources and deploy those resources to deal with a 
disaster (Åhman et al. 2009; Olsson/Larsson 2009; Boin/Rhinard 2008; Ekengren 2008). Soon after, at the 
38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2005, ASEAN members also institutionalized cooperation in this 
field by adopting a comprehensive legal framework for disaster management, and additionally endorsed 
the idea of creating their own regional structure to cope with disasters, the AHA Center. This is somewhat 
surprising. Disaster management centers are indeed not common in the world, and the two other exis-
tent examples, set up by the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and by the Central 
American Integration System (SICA), are still in an embryonic stage, tasked only with activities of research 
and disaster prevention respectively. Unlike the CPM and the AHA Center, they do not have operational 
hubs for monitoring, coordinating and responding to disaster events.
Third, when looking at the institutional frameworks of the EU and ASEAN’s regional disaster management 
centers we can observe important similarities, which will be explored in the next section by making use of 
the analytical framework proposed by Bremberg and Britz (2009), and operationalized through the criteria 
to study disaster management systems identified by Boin et al. (2009; 2013: 25-26; 38-39). In this analy-
sis, I will thus look at: 1) the goals that the two organizations seek to pursue and uphold within the field 
of disaster management (as contained in their legislative frameworks)4, and 2) the associated practices 
4 Considering the plethora of legal texts ruling civil protection cooperation at the EU level, in this paper the main 
legal texts that are analyzed are those which lay down the foundations of the European Civil Protection Mecha-
nism: the Council Decision of 23 October 2001, recast by a Council Decision of 2006, and the Council Decision 
of 5 March 2007 establishing the Civil Protection Financial Instrument and the TFEU. On the ASEAN side, there 
is only one legal agreement - AADMER. It is worth noting that against the innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
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for pursuing these goals. The goals are found in the disaster management concepts of the two regional 
organizations, and are related to the objective of their activities, disaster type (natural vs. natural and man-
made) and the scope of activities, that is the geographic boundaries (inside vs. outside) pertaining to their 
systems. The practices to pursue these goals can be analyzed by examining the way in which the CPM and 
the AHA Center work, in terms of key actors that are responsible for disaster management activities; added 
value of the centers (coordination vs. management); type of activation of regional assistance (bottom up 
vs. top down); type of assistance offered  (voluntary vs. compulsory); and tools adopted (less intrusive, for 
example research and training, vs. intrusive, for example information sharing or monitoring).
3.1 Comparing the CPM and the AHA Center: Goals and Practices
In terms of goals that the EU and the ASEAN seek to pursue in the sphere of disaster management one can 
observe preliminarily that the EU Council decision of October 2001 and AADMER have defined cooperation 
in this area in broad terms, with the ultimate goal of facilitating cooperation among their members not only 
to protect people, but also property. The EU Council Decision (Art 1.2) and AADMER (Art. 2) have both in-
cluded the protection of environmental, economic and social assets as part of the objective of regional co-
operation, thus potentially broadening the types of disasters that may activate the regional centers. With 
regard to the type of disaster pertaining to the EU and ASEAN systems, the first has opted for an all-hazards 
perspective, encompassing both natural and man-made hazards, including “technological, radiological and 
environmental accidents” (Council Decision 2001, Art. 1.2)5.  Likewise, at the ASEAN level, AADMER (Art. 5) 
indicates that disaster risks encompass “natural and also human-induced hazards”, without further speci-
fying the concept. The only concrete difference existing between the EU and ASEAN disaster management 
goals can be found in the sections about geographic boundaries of their activities. While the CPM may also 
be activated for disasters “outside the Community” (Council Decision 2001, Art.1.2), ASEAN’s activities are 
limited to the Southeast Asian region only.
A large number of similarities can also be found in the practices of cooperation, particularly in the way 
in which both the CPM and the AHA Center are conceived to work. As argued above, in both regions 
the primary actors responsible for disaster management activities are nation states. Within ASEAN, the 
ACDM, comprising the heads of agencies responsible for disaster management, is in charge of coordi-
nating regional activities in this sphere, whereas the ASEAN Secretariat assists all the relevant bodies in 
formulating disaster policies and programs (ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster Management 2004-2010: 
2007). At the EU level, since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the Council has shared legislative power 
with the Parliament. The European Commission can now propose legislation in civil protection more easily. 
However, the key actors dealing with civil protection are still the member states. Both the EU and ASEAN 
systems are thus affected by the fact that - unlike nation states, which are characterized by a coherent 
Treaty, new legislation has been recently adopted at the EU level, namely Decision no. 1313/2013/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, which  will 
however not be discussed in this paper.
5 Since the following Council Decision (2007/779) terrorism has also been included in the scope of EU civil protec-
tion cooperation.
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disaster framework - it is difficult to speak with one voice and to identify leadership at a strategic level6. 
In fact, the CPM was conceived only “to support in the event of emergencies and facilitate improved coor-
dination of assistance intervention provided by the Member countries” (Council of the EU 2001, Art.1.2). 
It does not replace national state agencies, and its added value mostly consists in supplementing national 
policies, by offering coordination and situation awareness to states incapable of coping with a disaster on 
their own. It does not  undertake concrete operations on the ground. Similarly, cooperation within the AHA 
Center is not intended to replace national action, but to “facilitate cooperation and coordination among 
the Parties” (AADMER, Art. 20.1). Particularly, according to EU officials at ECHO and officials at the AHA 
Center, one of the benefits of these centers is that a stricken member state can appeal to a single informa-
tion and coordination center instead of having to activate a whole range of bilateral contacts. In brief,
the CPM and the AHA Center serve as facilitators of assistance coordination between their members, 
a task which is not easy given the fact that they operate in regional contexts characterized by the exis-
tence of a plethora of disaster agencies, diverse capacities and levels of risk exposure.7
As a result of this, even in the most extreme case of disaster “the requesting member state shall be respon-
sible for directing assistance interventions” (Council Decisions 2007/779, Art. 4.7.). Likewise, in the ASEAN 
region, the AHA Center will never act as a first responder and the national agency of the affected country 
will be in charge of operations on ground.
Another commonality between the CPM and the AHA Center is that they cannot intervene automatically 
in the face of a disaster. The CPM can be activated upon request, only if “the preparedness of a member 
state is not sufficient for an adequate response to a major emergency” (Council Decision 23 October 2001), 
that is in the event of a major emergency, which outstrips a nation state’s capacities, or in the event of an 
imminent threat of such a circumstance. Alternatively, participating countries may voluntarily pool their 
civil protection capacities for the affected countries inside and outside of the Union. Similarly, the AHA 
Center can be activated “in the event that a party requires assistance to cope with a disaster situation”, 
which overwhelms the nation state (AADMER, Art 20.2), or through a voluntary offer of assistance from 
other ASEAN members.
There is also a striking similarity between ASEAN and the EU in the way assistance is provided. In both cases 
provision is voluntary and member states are not formally obliged to assist countries that are unable on 
their own to deal with a disaster event. In contrast to nation-states’ systems, solidarity clauses8  endorsed 
by the legislations of both regional organizations do not presume any formal obligation to assist member 
6 This observation is based on interviews held with technical consultants of the ASEAN-EU Emergency Programme 
in Jakarta 2014, and secondary source literature on the EU CPM.
7 Interview no. 4 with a High Official of the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme, Jakarta, February 15, 
2014.  
8 Whereas this clause is included within the AADMER, the solidarity clause at the EU level was initially included in 
the Constitutional Treaty by agreement of delegates to the European Convention in July 2003, and adopted by EU 
Heads of State or Government in June 2004. The Lisbon Treaty also includes a solidarity clause in Art. 222. Yet, as 
noted by Myrdal and Rhinard (2010), its precise meaning and implications are still being assessed.
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countries - in contrast to nation states’ systems, in which assistance is obligatory - and can be interpreted 
merely as moral commitments. As a result, in both organizations it may occur that the regional disaster 
management center is unable to channel any assistance to the affected state. As one official working at the 
Italian Civil Protection Department highlights: 
[V]ery often we send requests for assistance through the CPM, especially in the summer time for forest 
fires. But it is often the case that other member countries are unable to offer any assistance through the 
mechanism, because they have not adequate resources or because their capacities are already being 
used for other emergencies. There is not any assurance we will receive any form of assistance from the 
Mechanism.9 
Finally, some similarities concern the operational instruments that allow ASEAN and the EU to coordinate 
their resources. It is important to note that in both organizations these instruments are not the result 
of one single master plan, but that they have grown incrementally over the last decade. At the heart of 
the CPM is the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), recently replaced by the Emergency Response 
Coordination Center ERCC (2011), which serves as a non-stop communication hub between participating 
states and the coordinating system. It assures a constant monitoring of on-going and new disasters by way 
of an internal web-system (CECIS) to log the requests for assistance and to distribute these requests to 
the member states; and a set of modules formed by autonomous and self-sufficient inter-operable units 
located in the member states, which can be moved to a disaster site at short notice and shall replace other 
forms of ad hoc assistance on a bilateral basis. 
Additionally, a set of new operational mechanisms has recently been created within ASEAN to support the 
functioning of the AHA Center, namely the Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS). It serves as 
a multi-hazard event-tracking and decision-making support tool, similar to the CECIS, with self-sufficient 
units to intervene on the ground. These units, the so-called ERAT, initially conceived as comprised only of 
risk assessment teams, and a Disaster Emergency Response Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA) comprising 
stockpiles of relief items and capacity building of the AHA Center and Member States, is located in Subang. 
The creation of the DMRS is undoubtedly one of the most important developments within the ASEAN 
disaster management system. Its emergence signals an evident movement beyond the traditional practice 
of non-interference, towards a more intrusive approach aimed at facilitating information sharing between 
ASEAN members. In fact, the system serves not only to simply track disaster events but more importantly 
to log information related to disasters into a central system (for example the number of people affected, 
the local needs, and the assistance that has been requested and/or offered) and to render this information 
fully available to all countries in the region (Pennisi di Floristella forthcoming 2015).
Considering this picture, one cannot neglect great similarities between the institutional frames of the CPM 
and the AHA Center. However, there are also differences, which characterize the organizations. First, al-
though both the CPM and the AHA Center aim to develop activities covering the full disaster-cycle, includ-
ing all phases of disaster management (prevention, mitigation and aftermath), there is variance in their de-
gree of development. With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has made a commitment towards a stronger effort to 
9 Telephone Interview no. 17 with an Official of the Civil Protection Department of Italy, Jakarta January 27, 2014. 
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improve the prevention component, while the AHA Center has so far focused on monitoring and response 
activities. Second, although the CPM was originally intended for internal use (assisting EU member states), 
it has, unlike ASEAN, been increasingly used for the coordination of missions outside of the EU (Boin et 
al. 2013: 42). Differences have to be noted also with regard to financial resources. At the EU level in 2007, 
the Civil Protection Financial Instrument was set up to facilitate reinforced cooperation between member 
states in the field of civil protection10. The instrument has been allocated an amount of up to € 189.8 million 
under the EU’s 2007-13 financial framework11. By contrast, ASEAN relies on more limited budget. Each 
ASEAN member contributes the amount of US $ 30,000, but may contribute additional voluntary funds, 
collected in the AADMER Fund. As a consequence, ASEAN activities in the emergency response sphere de-
pend largely upon the external support of dialogue partners. For example, the establishment of DELSA was 
financed through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) to the amount of US $ 12.2 million. Furthermore, 
the US supported the ASEAN DMRS, and the EU assists knowledge development in various areas of the 
ASCC, including DRR, with a budget of € 73 million through the ASEAN-EU Dialogue Instrument (READI) 
Facility. Finally, in order to assure better coordination and disaster response inside and outside the EU, 
the Lisbon Treaty foresaw the creation of the position of the Commissioner for International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, currently headed by Kristalina Georgieva. ASEAN also endorsed the 
idea of strengthening the position of the ASEAN Secretary General as Humanitarian Coordinator in disaster 
events, but its role and major tasks have not yet been clearly defined.
Despite these disparities, how can we explain the number of substantial similarities, particularly the way 
in which the ASEAN and the EU disaster management centers have been conceived? Additionally, how can 
we explain the fact that ASEAN has moved away from its usual processes which have tended to circumvent 
any form of institutionalization towards endorsing more regulated and ruled-based institutions such as the 
AHA Center? After all, the latter has been empowered by formal rules and operational mechanisms, which 
appear to be in concert with those endorsed by the EU in its CPM, “involving more coordinated responses, 
among other things the sharing of information, the provision of relief and assistance in disaster management, 
and even more significantly, working towards more coordinated responses” (Caballero Anthony 2010: 7). 
10 The instrument also covers response and preparedness actions covered by the EU‘s Civil Protection Mechanism, 
for example training, exercises and missions.
11 In addition, within the EU-system up to 55 percent of the costs for transporting assistance can be co-financed by 
the EU Commission.
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Table 1: Comparison of the EU and the ASEAN Disaster Management Systems Based on Key Criteria
Source: Adapted from Bremberg and Britz (2009) and Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard (2013)
4. Conceptual Framework: Transfer under Domestic Conditions - Lesson-Drawing and 
Emulation
Existing scholarship has not yet attempted to comprehensively explore why different regional organiza-
tions are institutionalizing new forms of cooperation as proposed by the case study, yet IR literature offers 
many possible factors that can explain parts of the process. On the one hand, structuration theorists (Hay 
1995: 197) would argue that systemic conditions and challenges prevail over actors’ capability to elaborate 
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their strategies. They might pose important constraints on the agendas of regional institutions, which react 
to changes in the international system by reshaping their political priorities, redesigning their institutional 
architecture, and advancing new norms and modes of cooperation. Therefore, under the pressure of sys-
temic factors there might be a tendency by distinctive regional processes to grow more alike. However, 
similarities arise irrespectively of the behavior of other states as a result of independent responses to 
parallel problem pressures (Hoberg 2001: 127).
By contrast, the literature on policy transfer (Dolowitz/Marsh 1996; Evans 2009), which is used in this study 
to structure the empirical analysis, would take into account the importance of transnational processes 
and horizontal pathways as factors to explain marked similarity in the institutional design and cooperative 
modes of regional organizations. In other words, similar outcomes are analyzed through the lenses of in-
terdependent decisions.  While for a long time this literature has predominantly focused on policy transfer 
between states, it is increasingly recognized that processes of transfer can also occur between regional 
organizations (Stone 2004; Börzel/Risse 2012; Jetschke 2009; Lenz 2012; Katsumata 2011; Jetschke/Lenz 
2013). Regional organizations are, in fact, not atomistic structures that make decisions independently from 
each other (Jahn 2006), but “structures where knowledge about policies, institutions and arrangements 
in one time and/or place is often used in the development of policies, institutions and arrangements in 
another time and/or place” (Dolowitz/Marsh 1996: 344).12 
Generally, the mechanisms through which this knowledge is transferred have been classified along two 
main continuums: on the one hand, coercive and voluntary mechanisms (Dolowitz/Marsh 1996), and on 
the other hand, direct and indirect mechanisms (Börzel/ Risse 2009, 2012). Both coercive and direct mech-
anisms are centered on a top-down approach. They share the view that it is the sender side of the rela-
tionship, which uses varying degrees (“harder or softer”) of mechanisms to induce the recipient country to 
adopt a particular policy, program or arrangement. This can occur through 1) coercion (Di Maggio/Powell 
1991: 67); 2) conditionality, externalities or reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 
673-674); 3) incentives and various programs for assistance (Börzel/Risse 2012: 7); or 4) through forms of 
socialization (Checkel 2005a: 807-808). Examples of these types of mechanisms span from purely vertical 
processes such as coercion (Levi Faur 2005) to more horizontal processes of international collaboration, 
such as securing grants or loans. In the latter case, although an exchange process does occur, the recipient 
is essentially denied freedom of choice (Evans 2009: 245). 
Meanwhile at the other end of the spectrum, indirect and voluntary processes of transfer can be consid-
ered bottom-up mechanisms of transfer, as they focus on the role that the receiver plays in those processes. 
That is to say, transfer is not induced by the active promotion of ideas or models, but by local actors who 
voluntarily borrow programs or arrangements used elsewhere and adopt them to their own political con-
text (Dolowitz/Marsh 1996: 346). Most authors suggest that the catalysts of these processes are domestic 
dissatisfaction with the status quo, what Rose (1991) has defined as lesson drawing or various forms of 
emulation (Di Maggio/Powell 1991). 
12 This definition by Dolowitz and Marsh is used as the main conceptualization of transfer in this paper.
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Which of these mechanisms are likely to account for processes of transfer from an EU-like disaster manage-
ment arrangement to ASEAN? Presumably, coercive and direct mechanisms of transfer are not applicable 
in this case. The EU exerts forms of coercion and conditionality only on its member states or neighboring 
countries and has limited direct power in the promotion of its policies, institutions and modus operandi 
in those regions of the so-called far abroad, such as ASEAN (Börzel/Risse 2012: 2). Although, it is true that 
since the end of the nineties the EU has imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar due to severe human 
rights violations and the absence of substantial progress towards an inclusive democratization process, 
sanctions remain irrelevant in our case. Additionally, the EU has made no deliberate effort to promote a 
model of regional disaster cooperation, such as in the fields of human rights, democracy promotion, or eco-
nomic and regional integration (Bicchi 2006; Börzel/Risse 2009; Jetschke 2009). Neither has it attempted 
to persuade and socialize ASEAN members to retool their regional system to cope with disasters. Indeed, 
it is only recently with the Nuremberg Declaration on the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2007), that 
disaster cooperation has made a timid appearance as an issue in the ASEAN-EU inter-regional dialogue. 
And with the adoption of the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action, the EU has committed itself for the years 
2013-2017 to support ASEAN in developing regional capacities to realize the goal of becoming a disaster 
resilient community. Moreover, programs for financial assistance have emerged only at later stages, for ex-
ample with the launch of the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI Project) for the years 2011-
2015. It is of equal significance that influential actors such as Japan and the United States have been very 
supportive of ASEAN in this regard. However, while one should certainly not neglect the ability of technical 
assistance programs to facilitate the spread of new ideas and instruments, it would be an over-simplifica-
tion to consider them as direct mechanisms of transfer. On the one hand, they are not dependent on the 
fulfilment of specific conditions (Jetschke/Lenz 2012: 628), and on the other hand, they may result from 
the specific request from the recipient side of the relationship. 
With respect to the mechanisms most likely to play a role for the case discussed in this paper, we can thus 
expect that bottom-up mechanisms, heavily dependent on domestic conditions on the recipient side of 
the relationship, that is ASEAN, are crucial. This can be driven by a domestic demand for new solutions to 
solve particular problems (learning), or by a desire to acquire domestic or external legitimacy (emulation). 
In order to clarify, IR scholarship has conceived various definitions of learning, which encompass several 
distinctive processes and approaches, following either a rational or sociological logic (Bennet/Howlett 
1992; Zito/Schout 2009). The outcome of learning has also been explored in different ways. According to 
Hall (1993), learning involves three different orders that span an arc from the new setting of instruments 
to a shift in the policy paradigm. More precisely, in his view, first order learning involves making minor ad-
justments while the overall goals and instruments remain the same. Second order learning is characterized 
by a retooling and the introduction of new policy techniques, as a result of dissatisfaction with the past 
experience; and third order learning involves a completely different conceptualization of policy problems 
and a radical change in the instruments as well as the goals behind a policy (Hall 1993). Other studies focus 
on mere forms of instrumental learning that do not challenge fundamental organizational values (Zito/
Schout 2009). This form of learning, which is considered useful in this study, is, for example, central to the 
concept of lesson-drawing developed by Rose. In Rose’s eyes, policy makers that need to find concrete 
solutions to problems rationally draw lessons by observing how a prominent or pioneering organization 
has reacted in a situation similar to their own. This process usually occurs in periods characterized by high 
uncertainty and a lack of routine (Rose 1991). The idea that the solution adopted by another actor might be 
                            Building the AHA: Learnign from the ECPM?  | 17
superior, more legitimate and credible (Katsumata 2011) may also act as a catalyst for emulation processes. 
Moreover, emulation often occurs with the aim to gain legitimacy at a domestic or international level 
(Katsumata 2011). Typically, the quest for legitimacy results in the adoption of a frame, which is expected 
to be appropriate in the respective context (Davis/ and Greve 1997). 
Nevertheless, the question that needs to be raised now is why ASEAN might be learning from the European 
Union or emulating its disaster management system? Why is it not learning from or emulating other actors, 
such as the United States and Japan, which are providing remarkable support for the development of 
ASEAN’s system? Simmons and Elkins (2005: 43) suggest three methods that “cognitively constrain policy 
engineers to follow”, namely: information cascade, availability of models, and reference group/familiarity. 
An information cascade occurs when actors, who face a context of great uncertainty and recognize a prob-
lem in the organization of service delivery, try to develop some basic theory on how to solve the problem 
by reviewing the various solutions available in order to make their decisions (Simmons/Elkins 2005). The 
availability of information about a model is thus essential to make transfer happen. The more information 
there is available about a certain model, the more likely it will be used as a reference point. However, the 
availability of a model is a necessary but insufficient condition for activating processes of transfer from the 
EU as other influential actors might also make their model easily available to ASEAN. By contrast, the third 
and most important heuristic mechanism, which could explain why ASEAN might opt for an EU-like insti-
tutional design and EU-like modes of cooperation, is familiarity (Simmons/Elkins 2005). In fact, practices 
and structures do not spread simply because they are available, but because they are acceptable solutions 
(Davis/ Greve 1997: 7), that are compatible with the domestic context. From this perspective, we can 
expect that the ASEAN member states might prefer to adopt practices that resonate with their domestic 
institutional structures from an actor that is considered familiar. Typically, familiarity occurs in contexts 
of cultural or political similarity, geographic proximity, shared history or similar economic and political 
development (Evans 2009: 259; Stone 2004: 552). It is obvious that ASEAN and the EU do not share these 
common characteristics. However, in the case of disaster management cooperation, ASEAN decision-mak-
ers may identify familiar models by comparing other visible institutional characteristics (Simmons/Elkins 
2005: 45) such as: 1) the organizational form of a regional organization; 2) intergovernmental coopera-
tion; 3) management of cooperation between several disaster agencies, which differ in terms of structures, 
capacities and variety of risks. In this sense, the fact that the EU cooperative model in this issue-area is 
organized in an intergovernmental fashion might render the adoption of the EU’s solutions and practices 
in the ASEAN context more feasible.
5. Empirics: The Gradual Transfer of the EU Model of Cooperation in the Sphere of 
Natural Disasters 
Based on interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary sources, this paper uses process tracing 
to reconstruct the chronological evolution of the gradual transfer of the EU-type model of disaster coop-
eration to ASEAN. The method of process tracing offers the possibility to map out one or more potential 
causal paths leading to the outcome of the transfer process analyzed in this study (Bennett/George 2005: 
206-07). Furthermore, process tracing avoids the risk of conducting an analysis that is too detached from 
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reality (Checkel 2005b). In my case study of disaster cooperation, illustrated in the next sections, I find 
evidence of an incremental process of rational learning from and emulation of the EU since the set-up of 
the AHA Center in 2011, whereas, the initial shift in advancing new regional policies and institutions was 
driven mostly by domestic factors.
5.1 The First Phase (2003-2005): The Indian Ocean Tsunami and AADMER. From ASEAN’s 
Failure to an Initial Information Cascade
In ASEAN, initial concerns about disasters date back to 1971 when the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster 
Management met for the first time (Collins 2013: 132; Guilloux 2009: 287). Later on, the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord I further stressed the importance of cooperation in this area, recognizing that “natural 
disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states” (ASEAN 1976). 
This was followed by the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters (1976) calling on 
member countries to cooperate on the improvement of communication for early warning, dissemination 
of medical supplies, services and relief assistance, and exchange of experts, information and documents.
The Declaration however, remained only a declaratory document lacking a programmatic vision. 
Cooperation in this area thus remained fragmented and experts met only one time every two years to 
discuss technical issues rather than the development of a common ASEAN approach. Disaster manage-
ment was not felt as a priority to put on the ASEAN agenda, only over the last decade, all ASEAN mem-
bers suffering from a severe increase in the number of disasters affecting their countries, concretely 
engaged in a step-change.13
In 2003, ASEAN members made the first regional commitment to create the ACDM as a full-fledged 
committee comprising the heads of ASEAN National Disaster Management Agencies, instead of experts. 
Importantly, the decision to hold regular meetings once a year, improved the level of discussion and 
opened the path for the development of a more programmatic approach, initiated first at a meeting held in 
Brunei, in December 2003. At this meeting ASEAN members agreed to adopt the ASEAN Regional Program 
on Disaster Management (ARPDM) for the period 2004-2010, which endorsed some priority projects, in-
cluding the ASEAN Response Action Plan, which can be considered the embryonic idea of the AADMER, 
signed a few months later in July 2005, soon after the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
How can we account for these changes in disaster management cooperation? In this phase, the primary 
impetus for collaborative efforts within this field was mostly driven by domestic factors. First, the idea 
to institutionalize disaster cooperation can be explained by the new strategic environment at the end of 
the nineties. Some scholars point out that changes in ASEAN and in domestic politics, particularly among 
the so-called ASEAN five (namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore), opened the 
path for the development of a new agenda and the concomitant adoption of new norms and principles 
of cooperation, which culminated in the Declaration of Bali Concord II, and established the three ASEAN 
13 Interview no. 11 with a High Official of the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta February 20, 2014.
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Communities (Heng 2009: 3). Secondly, the inclusion of non-traditional security challenges and disaster 
management in the ASEAN agenda can be explained by the severe crises emanating from the financial 
and economic meltdown, as well as smoke-haze pollution. Both severely tested ASEAN traditional security 
mechanisms (Wulan/Bandarto 2007: 41-47). Fearing irrelevance and loss  of centrality in the eyes of both 
the international community and civil society, ASEAN thus attempted to revitalize its regional institutions, 
embarking on a wide array of cooperative projects in economics, social development and non-traditional 
security (Nesadurai 2009: 92). Notably, through the initiative of Indonesia, it promoted a new concept of 
comprehensive security embodied in the ASEAN Security Community (Wulan/Bandarto 2007: 41-47). Its 
members recognized inter alia that cooperation was needed to handle “concerns that are trans-boundary 
in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner”, 
and should include disaster management (Declaration of Bali II, point 5).
Thirdly and most importantly, ASEAN’s incremental initiatives in the sphere of disaster management are 
the result of an increasing exposure of ASEAN countries to a variety of disaster-related events, which have 
exacted high economic and humanitarian costs in the Southeast Asian region, and have caused displace-
ment and interregional tensions.14  Suffice it to remember that from 2000 to 2004 the Southeast Asian 
region experienced an increase in the total occurrence of disasters of approximately 30%, in comparison 
to the years 1994-2000 (EMDAT Database). Moreover, the fifth assessment (2014) of the International 
Panel on Climate Change reports an increased frequency of extreme weather-events in the region largely 
resulting from climate change impact. This sharp increase combined with the inadequacy of national solu-
tions to cope with hazardous events has dictated the reinforcement of cooperative initiatives. The issue 
of coordination has thus been put into sharp relief and ASEAN has started to search for concrete solutions 
to mitigate their effects (Caballero Anthony 2010: 2). In this regard, it is worth noting that although some 
countries have been particularly active in launching some specific initiatives, political leadership of the in-
dividual members does not seem to have played a crucial role in advancing cooperation in this area (Pennisi 
di Floristella forthcoming 2015). Indeed, since most ASEAN countries are experiencing either direct or 
indirect consequences deriving from natural disasters, they all have a vested interest in enhancing joint 
actions at the regional level (Pennisi di Floristella forthcoming 2015). 
The majority of the officials interviewed also pointed out that the need to find practical solutions to cope 
with these threats represented the most relevant impetus for progressive institutionalization in this field, 
which has been felt as a compelling priority in the aftermath of the Tsunami of December 2004. On that 
occasion, while local communities and national governments organized emergency relief operations sup-
ported by a large number of international agencies (Jayasuriya/McCawley 2010), ASEAN demonstrated its 
incapability in organizing any response. Only after the United States announced the establishment of a core 
group to coordinate relief efforts, did Singapore call for an ASEAN-organized emergency summit to discuss 
the crisis (Huxley 2005: 124). This exposed ASEAN to sharp criticism, as summed up in the words of one 
representative of the AADMER Partnership Group:
14 During the Indian Ocean tsunami it is clear that almost 230,000 people died and over one million people were 
displaced (Jasuriya/McCawley 2010: 2).
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[I]n the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami everybody in Southeast Asia and beyond was asking 
where is ASEAN? ASEAN credibility was put under strong attack when the two enormous waves se-
verely hit Banda Aceh, at the tip of North Sumatra in Indonesia, and the southern provinces of Thailand. 
This activated a gradual rethink of the traditional modalities of cooperation and provided the momen-
tum for the negotiation of AADMER.15 
Under these conditions, ASEAN members took their first concrete steps to develop an institutionalized 
disaster management system. However, although the above-mentioned domestic factors spurred these 
initial efforts, it would be wrong to consider AADMER, and the AHA Center in particular, as a merely in-
ternal product and a result of independent decision-making. Independence would, in fact, presuppose 
that ASEAN policy-makers would not have been informed about the choices made by others in this sphere 
(Holzinger/ Knill 2005: 786). By contrast, in a context of high uncertainty and the awareness of “ASEAN un-
preparedness and weakness in collectively addressing such large scale calamities” (Yong 2005 as quoted by 
Alles 2012: 157) as well as the compelling need to find practical solutions to advance new forms of regional 
cooperation, ASEAN started to search for external ideas. In this regard, Bennet (as quoted by Holzinger/
Knill 2005) observes that emulation might be a consequence of time and that the more a problem is per-
ceived as urgent, the more likely it is that an imitation of solutions will occur. In this context, it is worth 
noting that the ASEAN Secretariat organized a workshop to carry out an intensive study on how national, 
regional and international actors operate in the sphere of disaster management (information cascade). It is 
also remarkable that, according to an official at the EU External Action Service “the ASEAN Secretariat tried 
to engage the European Union to draft AADMER, but at that time the EU was not in the condition to offer 
any technical assistance to ASEAN”16. In this phase, the issue of disaster management was not part of the 
ASEAN-EU interregional agenda. The EU, through the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department (ECHO), was continuing to operate as a mere humanitarian donor in the Southeast 
Asian region by supporting, a wide range of community-based projects for disaster preparedness, disaster 
risk reduction and the strengthening of local communities’ resilience in synergy with local NGOs.17   
Against this picture, it is clear that at that time there was no direct effort from the European side to in-
fluence the development of ASEAN disaster programs. However, ASEAN’s attempt to get EU support for 
drafting AADMER suggests recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in this sphere as well as an interest 
in the EU’s instruments to cope with disaster risk. Furthermore, “the rush in the negotiation of AADMER 
by the ACDM, which felt the pressure to come out with something for political and humanitarian reasons”18 
made AADMER “one of the fastest-negotiated agreements in ASEAN’s history, having gone through a mere 
four months of negotiations”, as has been reported by the former ASEAN Secretary General Pitsuwan 
15 Interview no. 3 with a representative of the AADMER Partnership Group, Jakarta, February 14, 2014.
16 Interview no. 5 with a High Official at the EU External Action Service, Jakarta February 19, 2014. This might be 
explained by persistent violations of human rights in Myanmar, which became stumbling blocks from the EU side, 
impeding the advancement of the ASEAN-EU interregional dialogue and agenda, amongst others in the sphere of 
non-traditional security.
17 Since the nineties ECHO has supported projects in most Southeast Asian countries: Cambodia (since 1998), In-
donesia (since 1995), Lao PDR (since 1998), Myanmar (since 1994), the Philippines (since 1996), Thailand (since 
1995) and Vietnam (since 1994).
18 Interview no. 5 with a High Official at the External Action Service, Jakarta February 19, 2014.
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(Xinhua 2009). The provisions endorsed by AADMER to set up a regional disaster management center as a 
coordination hub between ASEAN members despite the lack of observable alternative centers at a regional 
level (with the exception of the European CPM experience), also suggest that some transfer from the EU 
might have occurred.
5.2 The Second Phase (2008 - onwards): Cyclone Nargis and the Establishment of the AHA 
Center. From Model Availability to a Process of Transfer in the Making
After AADMER was signed, cooperation in the field of disaster management entered a difficult phase within 
ASEAN. 
The ratification process of the agreement was indeed complicated by the reluctance of ASEAN members 
to share national information and logistic resources. Among others, Indonesia was extremely sensitive 
to the fact that cooperation through AADMER could have potentially implied the mobilization of aircraft 
and vessels in case of disasters.19
Additionally, setting up a budget for cooperation proved to be difficult, which was one of the reasons why 
combined efforts in this area did not make significant progress.
Finally, with Cyclone Nargis, another devastating catastrophe struck in the Irrawaddy Delta area in May 
2008, causing the deaths of 84,500 people and affecting another 2.4 million people. This represented the 
second most critical juncture, in ASEAN’s path towards disaster management cooperation. In fact, Cyclone 
Nargis highlighted once again ASEAN’s limited institutional capacity, through the lack of both a regional 
agreement and an operational center (Bellamy/Beeson 2010: 274). Although the ACDM activated some 
operational mechanisms, such as the rapid assessment teams composed of members of national disaster 
management organizations, its response was painfully slow and uncoordinated (Bellamy/Beeson 2010: 
274). In sum, the experience of Nargis provided the necessary impetus for the ratification of AADMER in 
2009, and paved the way for the negotiations regarding the establishment of the AHA Center, which was 
finally activated in 2011.
According to interviewed officials, ever since the AHA Center became a reality, there has been an interest 
in knowing more about how the EU works, which has resulted in the active seeking of a partnership with 
the EU by the ASEAN Secretariat. For instance, the managing director of the crisis response department, in 
the European External Action Service, Agostino Miozzo, was invited to Jakarta to explore possible avenues 
of cooperation with ASEAN. On that occasion, it was decided that study visits would be launched by the 
ASEAN Delegation to European civil protection structures.20 Thus in June 2012, senior representatives from 
19 Interview no. 16 with high official of the BNPB, Indonesia, Jakarta, February 25, 2014.
20 This was also facilitated by the fact that since early 2011 Myanmar has embarked on a remarkable path of politi-
cal and economic reforms and has committed itself to introduce democracy. In such a new context the ASEAN-EU 
interregional cooperation could finally step up.
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all ten ASEAN member states finally had the opportunity to examine EU arrangements, visit a number of 
Monitoring and Information and Coordination Centers, and to meet with officials of Civil Protection, ECHO 
and the European External Action Service. These visits have provided direct input to for learning more 
about how the EU coordinates disaster management activities with its member states, and has served to 
make the EU civil protection model fully available to ASEAN.  
Yet, two important questions need to be posed. First, why was ASEAN keen to cooperate with the EU, given 
the fact that other donors were already supporting its capacities? Second, what was the outcome of these 
visits? With regard to the first question, most of the officials interviewed highlighted that the EU shared the 
commonality of being a regional organization with ASEAN. To put it differently, it seemed that the reason 
why ASEAN was keen to engage the EU was that the latter was regarded as a familiar institution, while all 
the other donors were mostly seen as providers of technical assistance. Inter alia, it is worth quoting one 
of the high officials at the AHA Center:  
The reason why we are looking at the EU and seeking the partnership with it is that the EU is a regional 
organization like ASEAN. It shares our same philosophy, unlike the other nation states such as the 
United States and Japan, which have no idea of what regional cooperation means. To be sure, the 
ASEAN region faces a higher frequency and magnitude of disasters and the capacities of ASEAN mem-
bers are more heterogeneous in terms of resources and personnel, furthermore the regional disasters 
management systems have different stages of development since the EU has already achieved a com-
munity status unlike ASEAN. Another big difference is that the EU mobilizes its resources outside its 
borders. But the principles of cooperation are the same. Therefore, we want to learn from the EU. The 
EU, has, in fact a long experience of cooperation in this area. The system has been implemented since 
more than ten years, we don’t need to invent anything.21 
Another official noted that: 
[T]he European Union is a valuable partner for ASEAN, because it has already established a regional 
hub to deal with disasters. This is something ASEAN wants to do! Thus, the joint ASEAN-EU visits have 
been a way for ASEAN to mirror the European Civil Protection system, to look at what it is applicable to 
the ASEAN context and to copy from it if considered to be adaptable.22 
Even more important is the fact that during the 20th ACDM meeting held in Bangkok from 24 to 25 July 
2012, soon after the knowledge exchange conducted in Brussels and Rome, the representatives of the 
national agencies of ASEAN disaster management organizations endorsed a confidential program, which 
identified the key areas for partnership with the EU for the years 2013-2018. Here the ACDM recognized 
in particular the value of knowledge exchange as a vehicle to institutionally strengthen the AHA Center 
and to develop its capacities: the ASEAN Secretariat, the ASEAN Secretary General’s Office, the ASEAN 
Humanitarian Coordinator Office, the ASEAN Committee of Disaster Management, as well as individual 
member states. Importantly, one interviewed official noted that: 
21 Interview no. 6 with a High Official at the AHA Center, Jakarta February 20, 2014.
22 Interview no. 7 with a High Official at the AHA Center, Jakarta February 20, 2014.
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[T]he concrete reference made by the document to EU civil protection modalities of cooperation (ECHO, 
CECIS, civil protection modules etc.) makes clear that ASEAN is taking as a concrete reference point the 
EU, particularly the way in which intra-regional cooperation in this area is put on the ground, for the 
development of  ASEAN institutional capacities.23
Following this, a move towards a selective borrowing of EU-like operational mechanisms could be observed. 
After the official visits, the ASEAN Rapid Assessment Teams (ERAT) were transformed into rapid response 
teams, mirroring European civil protection modules. Similarly, the in 2012 newly-founded DMRS, funded 
by the US Government, has been inspired by CECIS with its goal of matching requests of aid and offers of 
assistance between affected entities and assisting countries in the region. Furthermore, the DMRS should 
ensure the inter-operability between the regional center and its member states, thus overcoming the risk 
of insufficient coordination, which can result from both a lack of coherence of aid programs and differences 
in the objectives of the donors (for example timing of the intervention, or preferred type of assistance). 
Interestingly, it is also worth noting that the EU has recently launched a European program of technical as-
sistance, the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Program, with the goal of supporting the development of 
ASEAN capacities, and defined disaster management as one of the three pillars of its inter-regional agenda 
with ASEAN for the years 2014-2020.
At present, any evaluation of the ASEAN disaster management system would appear premature since the 
AHA Center still operates in its initial phase. Nonetheless, it is important to draw attention to the fact that 
already during typhoon Hayan in November 2013 the AHA Center undertook its first steps to support the 
national disaster management office of the Philippines. It deployed ERAT teams, established an office on 
the ground and mobilized resources to provide for emergency assistance. The newly born AHA Center 
monitored the disaster event together with the office in the Philippines and exchanged relevant infor-
mation with the other ASEAN partners to determine the intensity of the event. Particularly, Malaysia and 
Brunei used the AHA platform to offer assistance to the Philippines while Indonesia worked with the center 
at an informal level.
In conclusion, when interpreting ASEAN changes in the area of disaster management as the result of a 
gradual process of transfer from the EU, it is important to first exclude potentially alternative explanations. 
Primarily, it is clear that independent problem solving does not account for these developments since 
ASEAN has actively looked at other existing arrangements in this field. Second, as most of the interviewees 
have noted, nation state systems cannot offer a viable solution for ASEAN. The United States and Japan are 
sovereign states and cannot be compared to a regional organization. When a state is hit by a disaster, the 
US President can declare a state of emergency and has the duty to intervene. This is neither the case for the 
EU nor for ASEAN where nation states remain the primary actors responsible for dealing with emergencies 
and for authorizing any external intervention. In addition to this, nation states do not face the problem of 
overcoming difficulties in sharing sensitive information between different sovereign states, and ensuring 
the inter-operability of operational tools of the diverse national agencies, from the fire corps to equipment, 
23 Interview no. 5 with a High Official at the European External Action Service, Jakarta February 19, 2014. These 
initiatives focus in particular on the sharing of information between the EU and its member states, the mobilizati-
on of resources, the training and deployment of resources and personnel coming from different national agencies 
and the way in which decisions are made.
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armies, or naval forces. Finally, the argument that ASEAN could also have learned from other regional 
organizations is not plausible, since ASEAN bureaucrats are well aware of the fact that no other system in 
this issue area, has the same degree of operational development and solid structures as the CPM. It should 
be noted here that SAARC’s experts are now trying to get information from ASEAN to build up their own 
regional capacities. 
The only alternative option might have been offered by the United Nation disaster management sys-
tem, centered on the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which 
is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors and for coordinating UN emergency assistance 
(Coppola 2011: 555). However, when looking at the criteria as outlined in table 1, it is clear that the UN 
model does not correspond to the same institutional logic as the CPM and the AHA Center. The UN sys-
tem is not conceived as a global and single coordination and information hub, as it does not dispose of a 
situation room, creating situational awareness or of a discrete platform through which the actors involved 
in disaster management can closely exchange their data information, make relevant decisions on interven-
tions, and activate the center to request assistance or offer support. Only when a member state is stricken 
by disaster does the UN provide support to the affected country and, eventually, deploy a UN Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to assist relief activity coordination and assess damages and 
needs. Against this background, it is clear that the AHA Center model does not reflect the institutional logic 
of the UN. Nevertheless, it cannot be a priori excluded that in the case of specific mechanisms or activities 
of training aimed at ensuring the inter-operability between diverse actors acting on the ground, ASEAN 
might also have looked towards and borrowed from solutions adopted by the UN.
Having said this, it remains hard to believe that the AHA Center is a copy of the CPM. These two insti-
tutions remain divided by diverse degrees of development, notably the greater heterogeneity of ASEAN 
disaster agencies in comparison with European agencies. They also diverge in terms of their constitutive 
values. Unlike the EU, ASEAN remains reluctant to consider crises beyond natural disasters, due to its 
strict adherence to the principle of respect for national sovereignty, which acts as an impediment to the 
advancement of any form of cooperation in the area of man-made disasters (particularly terrorism). This 
approach prevents the development of a flexible understanding of non-interference. Furthermore, while 
the EU has adopted a civil protection financial instrument, the principle of equal contributions of ASEAN 
members to regional activities hampers an adequate provision of resources. Thus, ASEAN’s budget remains 
extremely limited and dependent upon external support. In reality, this difficulty arises also due to the 
wide disparity in member states’ incomes (that is some members, such as Brunei or Singapore, are high 
income nations, or upper-middle income nations such as Malaysia and Thailand, while others, such as 
Cambodia and Myanmar, are lower income nations) as well as due to problems deriving from risk sharing. 
In fact, whereas some ASEAN members have highly structured and equipped disaster management orga-
nizations (for example Singapore) and therefore can respond to disaster emergencies more easily without 
external support, disaster organizations in Cambodia and Laos are still underdeveloped. Finally, with the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the recent reform of the CPM, the EU is gradually strengthening the 
role of the Commission in disaster cooperation and has introduced the co-decision procedure and qualified 
majority in the Council, while consensus-based decision-making still remains the centerpiece of ASEAN 
regional cooperation.
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to analyze the development of the ASEAN disaster management system from the 
perspective of the literature on transfer, asking whether ASEAN’s new developments have been influenced 
by the European Union. The study argues that these developments, though strongly conditioned by do-
mestic factors, have also resulted from external ideas, and more precisely from the experience of the 
European Civil Protection Mechanism.
The empirical part of this work has shown that amongst other domestic factors, the most significant scope 
conditions accounting for ASEAN changes have been the two mega-disasters, which hit the region in 2004 
and 2008. The Indian Ocean Tsunami catalyzed the search for external ideas and led to the rapid adoption 
of AADMER, while Cyclone Nargis has opened the path for ratification of the agreement and the establish-
ment of the AHA Center. The creation of the AHA Center confronted ASEAN with the need to find proce-
dures and mechanisms, which would allow the Center to work and to coordinate monitoring and response 
to disasters at a regional level. ASEAN has also been keen to find out more about how the EU works in the 
field of disaster management. Of course, this search has been motivated by ASEAN’s attempts to preserve 
its legitimacy in the eyes of both the domestic and international community, after its failure to respond 
adequately in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. Thus a combination of lesson-drawing and emulation can 
be considered as the underlying mechanisms accounting for the gradual process of transfer from the EU.
It is in the context of uncertainty that a new form of interaction with the European Union has gained new 
momentum. In this regard, although the process of transfer seems to have been initiated by the receiving 
side of the relationship, “dictated by ASEAN pragmatism of finding new solutions to cope with its failure”24, 
the new activism of the European Union, including the launch of programs of technical assistance and 
knowledge exchange, appears to have further facilitated the adoption of EU-like operational mechanisms 
by ASEAN. It is also remarkable that familiarity acted as the main heuristic mechanism behind the process 
of transfer. From the evidence of the interviews, the EU model of regional cooperation, rather than its 
technical solutions to cope with specific disaster risks, is considered most applicable to the ASEAN context, 
because the EU is considered similar to ASEAN in this domain. Like ASEAN, the EU is a regional organization 
and faces similar problems of coordinating cooperation between a number of national agencies, differently 
structured and equipped, and confronted with diverse types of disasters and levels of disaster risk exposure. 
Using Peter Hall’s terminology (1993), it is clear though, that the output resulting from processes of transfer 
so far does not seem to have gone beyond second order adjustments in the instruments. It is thus selective 
and does not imply a change in ASEAN constitutive values. Moreover, it is unlikely that ASEAN will soon 
reach agreement on an increase in its budget expenditures to cope with disasters, or on the development 
of forms of cooperation in the area of man-made disasters, which involve issues too sensitive for ASEAN 
member states. Neither is it probable that the Association will move beyond consensual decision-making 
due to ASEAN’s core principles of defense of national sovereignty, equality and non-interference. Given 
the fact that the AHA Center is still in its initial phase, and that the EU has now committed to providing 
consistent technical assistance to ASEAN in the sphere of disaster management, we can at this point talk 
24 Telephone Interview no. 19, with a High Official at the External Action Service, Jakarta, May 2, 2014.
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of a process of transfer in the making. It will thus be interesting to observe whether ASEAN will borrow 
more elements from the EU in the coming years, and whether the latter will also be interested in taking up 
something new from ASEAN.
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